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THE EFFECTS OF ENERGY PRICES ON AGRICULTURAL
GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION FROM THE HIGH PLAINS
AQUIFER
LISA PFEIFFER and C.-Y. CYNTHIA LIN
We examine the effects of energy prices on groundwater extraction using an econometric model of a
farmer’s irrigation water pumping decision that accounts for both the intensive and extensive margins.
Our results show that energy prices have an effect on both types of margins. Increasing energy prices
would affect crop selection decisions, crop acreage allocation decisions, and farmers’ demand for water.
Our estimated total marginal effect, which sums the effects on the intensive and extensive margins,
suggests that a $1 per million btu increase in the energy price would decrease water extraction by an
individual farmer by 5.89 acre-feet per year, a decrease of 3.6 percent of the average annual extraction
rate. Our estimated elasticity of water extraction with respect to energy price is −0.26.
Key words: Energy, groundwater extraction.
JEL codes: Q15, Q40.

Many of the world’s most productive agricultural basins depend on groundwater. The food
that consumers eat, the farmers who produce
that food, and the local economies supporting that production are all affected by the
availability of groundwater. Worldwide, about
70% of water extracted or diverted for consumptive use goes to agriculture, but in many
groundwater basins, this proportion can be as
high as 95–99%. In many agricultural regions
throughout the world, energy is an important
input used to extract groundwater for irrigation (Schoengold and Zilberman 2007; Dumler
et al. 2009). Rising energy prices are therefore a potential concern for agriculture, as they
may affect the groundwater extraction and
crop choice decisions of farmers that require
energy to pump groundwater. In this article we
examine the effects that energy prices have on
groundwater extraction using an econometric
model of a farmer’s irrigation water pumping

Lisa Pfeiffer is an economist with the NOAA National Marine
Fisheries Service, Northwest Fisheries Science Center, Seattle,
Washington. C.-Y. Cynthia Lin is an associate professor in the
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University
of California at Davis, and a member of the Giannini Foundation
of Agricultural Economics.
This article was subjected to an expedited peer-review process
that encourages contributions that frame emerging and priority
issues for the profession, as well as methodological and theoretical
contributions.

decision that accounts for both the intensive
and extensive margins.
Our research focuses on the groundwater
used for agriculture in the High Plains (Ogallala) Aquifer system of the central United
States. There, 99% of the water extracted is
used for crop production, while the remaining 1% is used for livestock, domestic, and
industrial purposes. The economy of the region
is based almost entirely on irrigated agriculture. The alfafa, corn, sorghum, soybeans, and
wheat grown there are used for local livestock
production or exported from the region. The
small local communities support the agricultural industry with farm implement dealers,
schools, restaurants, and other services. The
state governments are also greatly concerned
with supporting their agricultural industry.
Energy is an important input required to
extract groundwater for irrigation in the High
Plains Aquifer. Dumler et al. (2009) estimate
that the energy cost of extracting irrigation
water represents approximately 10% of the
costs for growing corn in western Kansas,which
is a slightly greater share of costs than land
rent. In this article we examine whether energy
prices impact groundwater extraction.
For the empirical analysis, we use a unique
data set that combines well-level groundwater extraction data with physical, hydrological,
and economic data. Our econometric model of
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a farmer’s irrigation water pumping decision
has two components: the intensive margin and
the extensive margin. For the extensive margin, we estimate the farmer’s choice of how
many acres to allocate to each crop using a
simultaneous equations selection model. For
the intensive margin, we estimate the farmer’s
water demand conditional on his crop acreage
allocation decisions. In addition to energy
prices, we also control for other factors that
may affect groundwater extraction, including
depth to groundwater, precipitation, irrigation
technology, saturated thickness, recharge, and
crop prices.
Our results show that energy prices have
an effect on both the intensive and extensive margins. Increasing energy prices would
affect crop selection decisions, crop acreage
allocation decisions, and the demand for water
by farmers. The total marginal effect, which
sums the effects on the intensive and extensive margins, estimates that a $1 per million
btu increase in the energy price would decrease
water extraction by an individual farmer by
5.89 acre-feet per year. Our estimated elasticity of water extraction with respect to energy
price is −0.26.
Our article builds upon the work of
Zilberman et al. (2008), who develop theoretical models to analyze the effects of rising energy prices on the economics of water
in agriculture, and who find that the higher
cost of energy will substantially increase the
cost of groundwater. Our empirical analysis
also builds upon the work of Zhu, Ringler,
and Cai (2013), who simulate the effects of
energy prices on groundwater extraction in
India, China, the United States, and Vietnam.
We build upon these previous theory and simulation papers by empirically analyzing the
effects that energy prices have on groundwater
extraction.
Some of the existing empirical work on
the effects of energy prices on groundwater
extraction has taken place in a developing
country context. For example, Badiani and Jessoe (2013) empirically analyze the impact of
electricity subsidies on groundwater extraction
and agricultural production in India. Other
studies have used interviews or survey data
to analyze the relationship between energy
and groundwater extraction in India and/or
Mexico (Birner et al. 2007; Fan, Gulati, and
Sukhadeo 2008; Kumar 2005; Scott and Shah
2004).
In the U.S. context, Caswell and Zilberman
(1986), as well as Ogg and Gollehon (1989),
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both use pumping costs as proxies for water
prices in California and the western United
States, respectively. While these papers do
not specifically focus on energy, they implicitly acknowledge the role of energy costs in
on-farm pumping as a driver of water use decisions in the United States. Similarly, in their
estimates of crop choice, supply, land allocation, and water demand, Moore, Gollehon, and
Carey (1994) use as their water price an engineering formula that translates groundwater
pumping lift into marginal cost in dollars per
acre-foot.
In a related paper, estimate irrigation water
demand in Kansas using an estimate of extraction cost as their proxy for water price. We
build on these authors’ work in two ways.
First, while the focus of Hendricks and Peterson (2012) is on the effects of water price,
which they compute using a pre-specified function of the natural gas price and the depth
to groundwater, our focus is on the effects of
energy price. Thus, while Hendricks and Peterson (2012) focus on estimating the own-price
elasticity of irrigation water demand to calculate the cost of reducing irrigation water
use through water pricing, irrigation cessation,
and intensity-reduction programs, our article
focuses on the effects of energy prices on water
demand and crop choices in order to examine
the effects of rising energy prices.
The second way in which we build upon
Hendricks and Peterson (2012) is that our
econometric model not only controls for crop
acreage allocation decisions in the estimation
of water demand on the intensive margin, but it
also explicitly models the crop choice and crop
acreage allocation decisions in our estimation
of the extensive margin. Unlike Hendricks and
Peterson (2012), our model enables us to examine how changes in energy prices affect not only
water demand conditional on crop choice, but
also crop choice and crop acreage allocation
decisions.
The High Plains Aquifer in Kansas
Exploitation of the High Plains Aquifer system began in the late 1800s but was greatly
intensified after the “Dust Bowl” decade of the
1930s (Miller and Appel 1997). Aided by the
development of high capacity pumps and center pivot systems, irrigated acreage increased
from 1 million acres in 1960 to 3.1 million
acres in 2005, and accounts for 99% of all
groundwater withdrawals (Kenny and Hansen
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2004). Irrigation converted the region from the
“Great American Desert” into the “Breadbasket of the World” (Muilenburg et al. 1975).
The High Plains Aquifer underlies approximately 174,000 square miles, and eight states
overlie its boundary; it is the principle source
of groundwater in the Great Plains region of
the United States. Also known as the Ogallala
Aquifer, the High Plains Aquifer system is now
known to include several other aquifer formations. The portion of the aquifer that underlies
western Kansas, however, pertains mainly to
the Ogallala, and this is why the name persists
(Miller and Appel 1997).
The High Plains aquifer is underlain by rock
of very low permeability that creates the base
of the aquifer. The distance from this bedrock
to the water table is a measure of the total water
available and is known as the saturated thickness. Figure 1 shows that the saturated thickness of the High Plains aquifer in Kansas ranges
from nearly zero to over 300 feet (Buddemeier
2000).
The depth to water is the difference between
the altitude of the land surface and the altitude
of the water table. In areas where surface and
groundwater are hydrologically connected, the
water table can be very near to the surface.
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In other areas, the water table is much deeper;
the depth to water is over 400 feet below the
surface in a portion of southwestern Kansas
(Miller and Appel 1997). The depth to groundwater is shown in figure 2.
Water recharge to the Kansas portion of the
High Plains aquifer is very small, and is primarily completed by percolation of precipitation
and return flow from water applied as irrigation. The rates of recharge vary between 0.05
and 6 inches per year, with the greatest rates
of recharge occurring where the land surface is
covered by sand or other permeable material
(Buddemeier 2000).
Groundwater users in Kansas extract water
under the doctrine of prior appropriation,
meaning that they are allotted a maximum
amount to extract each year. This annual
amount was determined when the user originally applied for the permit and is the same
fixed amount each year (Pfeiffer and Lin 2012).
Appropriation contracts are stated in terms of a
maximum acre-feet of extraction per year with
a “use it or lose it” clause. Until recently (2012),
farmers must use their allocation each year and
are unable to bank any unused portions of the
water allocation in a particular year for use in
future years. However, since the groundwater

Saturated Thickness
0 - 50 ft
51 - 100 ft
101 - 200 ft
201 - 300 ft
over 300 ft

Figure 1. Predevelopment saturated thickness of the Kansas portion of the High Plains Aquifer
Source: Kansas Geological Survey.
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Depth to Water (ft)
0 - 50
51 - 100
101 - 150
151 - 200
201 - 250
Over 250

Figure 2. Average 2004-2006 depth to groundwater in the Kansas portion of the High Plains
Aquifer
Source: Kansas Geological Survey.

is in part a nonrenewable resource, and since
the availability of water is stochastic owing to
variable weather and rainfall and since demand
for water is greater when it is less available,
farmers could operate in a more dynamically
efficient manner if the appropriator could use
less water in some years and more in others
(Lin and Pfeiffer, forthcoming). Nevertheless,
Pfeiffer and Lin (2013) find that despite the
incentives given to groundwater users to pump
their maximum allowable amount in each year
by the prior appropriation doctrine, farmers
extract water consistent with a dynamic model
of resource extraction.
The main crops grown in western Kansas
are alfalfa, corn, sorghum, soybean, and wheat
(High Plains Regional Climate Center 2014).
Corn production accounts for more than 50%
of all irrigated land (Buddemeier 2000), with
soil types and access to high volumes of irrigation water determining the suitability of a
particular piece of land to various crops.
Evapotranspiration is the loss of water to
the atmosphere by the combined processes of
evaporation (from soil and plant surfaces) and
transpiration (from plant tissues). This process is thus an indicator of how much water
crops require for healthy growth and productivity. Many factors affect evapotranspiration:

weather parameters such as solar radiation,
air temperature, relative humidity, and wind
speed; soil factors such as soil texture, structure, density, and chemistry; and plant factors
such as plant type, root depth and foliar density, height, and stage of growth. Since there
are so many factors that affect evapotranspiration, it is extremely difficult to formulate an equation that can produce estimates
of evapotranspiration under different sets of
conditions. Therefore, the idea of reference
crop evapotranspiration was developed by
researchers; this refers to the evapotranspiration rate of a reference crop expressed in inches
or millimeters (CIMIS 2009).
Reference crops are alfalfa surfaces, whose
biophysical characteristics have been studied
extensively. The logic behind the reference
evapotranspiration idea is to establish weather
stations on standardized reference surfaces for
which most of the biophysical properties used
in evapotranspiration equations are known.
Using these known parameters and measured
weather parameters, evapotranspiration from
such surfaces is estimated. Then a crop factor, commonly known as crop coefficient, is
used to calculate the actual evapotranspiration
for a specific crop in the same microclimate
as the weather station site (CIMIS 2009). The
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Evapotranspiration

Crop
Alfafa
Corn
Sorghum
Soybeans
Wheat

Crop

Crop Coefficient
0.10 – 1.00
0.10 – 1.10
0.10 – 1.10
0.10 – 1.10
0.10 – 1.10

Source: High Plains Regional Climate Center, 2014.

crop coefficient for a particular crop varies
depending on the stage of growth for the
crop.
Table 1 presents the range of the crop coefficients for the High Plains for each of the
main crops grown in western Kansas as calculated by the High Plains Regional Climate
Center (2014). As table 1 illustrates, the range
of the crop coefficients overlap with each other
so that the relative ranking of the crops by
water intensiveness may vary depending on
the stage of growth for each crop. There is
therefore no clear ranking of these crops by
water intensiveness, and the upper bound crop
coefficient for alfafa is lower than that for the
other crops.
The quality of water in the High Plains
aquifer is affected by many factors. These factors include the chemical composition and
solubility of aquifer materials, the increase in
dissolved solids concentrations in groundwater
in areas where the water discharges by evapotranspiration, and the chemical composition
of water that recharges the aquifer. The dissolved solids concentration in groundwater is
a general indicator of the chemical quality of
the water. In most of Kansas, dissolved solids
concentrations in water from the High Plains
aquifer are less than 500 milligrams per liter,
the limit of dissolved solids recommended by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for
drinking water, but locally can exceed 1,000
milligrams per liter (Miller and Appel 1997).
Excessive concentrations of sodium in water
adversely affect plant growth and soil properties, and constitute salinity and sodium hazards
that may limit irrigation development. Sodium
that has been concentrated in the soil by evapotranspiration and ion exchange decreases soil
tillability and permeability; areas of high or
very high sodium hazard occur in parts of
Kansas, while sodium concentrations in water
from the High Plains aquifer are less than 25
milligrams per liter in most of northern Kansas.
Concentrations are greatest in southwestern
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Kansas where evapotranspiration rates are
high and in south-central Kansas, where the
High Plains aquifer overlies Permian bedrock
that contains saline water derived from the partial dissolution of salt beds (Miller and Appel
1997).
Overall, it does not seem that significant
irrigation-related increases in salinity exist in
western Kansas, except in the Valley-Fill Alluvium soils along river beds and in the Permian
rock bed area. The Valley-Fill Alluvium unit
is susceptible to increasing salinity because
irrigation water is recycled along alluvial valleys in a downstream direction as water is
pumped from the aquifer or diverted from
the river, applied to fields, and then returned
to the aquifer as irrigation drainage. During
each irrigation/return flow cycle, salinity is
increased as water is transpired by crops and
as return-flow water dissolves additional minerals from the soil (Litke 2001). Nitrate and
pesticide contamination appears to be a problem in some areas and is related to land use
(Steichen et al. 1998; Helgesen, Stullken, and
Rutledge 1994).
Data
We use a particularly rich data set for our
empirical analysis. Kansas has required the
reporting of groundwater pumping by water
rights holders since the 1940s, although only
data from 1996 to the present are considered
to be complete and reliable. The data are available from the Water Information Management
and Analysis System (WIMAS). Spatially referenced pumping data at the source (well or
pump) level is included, and each data point
identifies the farmer, field, irrigation technology, amount pumped, and crops grown.
The crop price data we use are a combination
of spring futures contracts for September delivery for commodities with futures contracts
and average price received for crops without
futures contracts. Futures prices are taken from
the Commodity Research Board, and price
received is from the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research
Service.
Of the acres irrigated from groundwater
wells in Kansas, about 50% are supplied by
pumps powered with natural gas, 25% are supplied by pumps powered with diesel fuel, and
22% are supplied by pumps powered with electricity (FRIS 2004); our water data does not
indicate the type of energy used for irrigation.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Individual-year level variables
Irrigation water pumped (af)
Acres planted to alfafa
Acres planted to corn
Acres planted to sorghum
Acres planted to soybeans
Acres planted to wheat
Irrigation water used by neighbors (1 mile radius, af)
Depth to groundwater (ft)

154,619
154,619
154,619
154,619
154,619
154,619
154,619
154,619

164.37
11.92
59.90
5.12
11.09
16.49
437.72
125.27

124.12
39.22
74.32
24.23
33.82
43.18
428.38
74.48

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.77

1,491.48
640.00
640.00
620.00
542.00
584.00
4,586.97
355.87

Individual level variables
Recharge (in)
Average precipitation (in)
Average evapotranspiration (in)
Slope (% of distance)
Irrigated Capability Class=1 (dummy)
Saturated Thickness of the aquifer (ft)
Quantity authorized for extraction (af)
Field size (ac)

17,960
17,960
17,960
17,960
17,960
17,960
17,960
17,960

1.25
21.64
55.19
1.07
0.45
126.27
283.81
183.97

1.13
3.77
1.02
0.88
0.50
104.86
206.90
102.76

0.30
16.00
48.89
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
60.59

6.00
32.90
58.75
8.68
1.00
553.64
2,400.00
640.00

10
10
10
10
10
10

2.56
6.84
5.95
3.57
81.23
2.70

0.32
1.84
1.17
0.32
9.51
0.31

2.24
5.17
4.52
3.18
70.58
2.29

3.20
11.12
7.73
4.19
95.92
3.14

10
10
10

7.33
11.21
4.99

2.54
1.35
2.35

5.15
10.12
3.00

13.39
14.50
10.56

Year-level variables
Corn price futures ($/bu)
Sorghum price futures ($/bu)
Soy price futures ($/bu)
Wheat price futures ($/bu)
Alfalfa price ($/ton)
10 year forecast of the real acreage-weighted price of
commodities ($/bu)
Energy price, base case ($/million btu)
Energy price, alternative A ($/million btu)
Energy price, alternative B ($/million btu)

Notes: In the base case specification, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas production, and the diesel price as
the energy price for all other farmers. In specification A, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas production,
and the electricity price as the energy price for all other farmers. In specification B, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for all farmers.

In our base case specification, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers
in counties with natural gas production, which
represents 55.2% of the farmers, and the diesel
price as the energy price for all other farmers.
For robustness, we also run our model using
two alternative specifications for the energy
price. In specification A, we use the natural gas
price as the energy price for farmers in counties
with natural gas production and the electricity
price as the energy price for all other farmers.
In specification B, we use the natural gas price
as the energy price for all farmers. County-level
natural gas production data used to determine
which counties had natural gas production are
taken from the Kansas Geological Survey. Natural gas prices, diesel prices and electricity
prices come from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration and are all converted to units
of dollars per million btu.

Soil characteristics come from the Web Soil
Survey of the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service. The irrigated capability class
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the soil is
classified as the best soil for irrigated agriculture with few characteristics that would limit
its use, and zero otherwise. Precipitation data
come from the PRISM group.
Summary statistics for the variables used
in the analysis are presented in table 2. The
average quantity of irrigation water pumped
per individual farmer per year is 164.37 acrefeet. In a one-mile radius, an average of 437.72
acre-feet of water are pumped by neighboring
farmers. The average depth from the surface
of the ground to groundwater is 125.27 feet.
Potential recharge to the Kansas portion of
the High Plains Aquifer is low; the average
potential recharge is 1.25 inches annually.
Each farmer received an average of 21.64
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inches of precipitation per year. The average
slope of the ground surface, as a percentage of
distance, is 1.07%. About 45% of the plots are
in irrigated capability class 1. Field size is an
average of 183.97 acres. Energy prices for our
base case specification are, on average, $7.33
per million btu.

Empirical Model
We examine the effects of energy prices on
groundwater extraction using an econometric
model of a farmer’s irrigation water pumping
decision that accounts for both the intensive
and extensive margins. The extensive margin
of the groundwater extraction decision is the
crop choice and crop acreage allocation decision, and involves a simultaneous equation
model in which the dependent variables (the
number of acres planted to each crop) are censored by sample selection. A positive number
of acres planted to crop c is observed only
when the farmer chooses to plant crop c. Thus,
the sample of crop c-planters is non-random,
and drawn from a wider population of farmers. Both choices (the decision to plant and the
number of acres planted to crop c) must be
modeled to avoid sample selection bias. Optimal land allocation nict ∗ to each crop c by each
farmer i in each time period t can be estimated
as:
qict = f (et , pct , x it , z it−1 , dit ),
c = alfalfa, corn, sorghum,
(1)

soybeans, wheat
∗

nict = g(et , pct , x it , dit , IMRc ),
c = soybeans, wheat, sorghum,
(2)

soybeans, wheat

where qict represents the decision to plant crop
c; nict ∗ is the number of acres planted to each
crop c and is observed only when qict > 0; et
are energy prices; pct are crop price futures (for
delivery at harvest); xit is a vector of plot-level
variables including field size, irrigation technology, average precipitation, average evapotranspiration, slope, soil quality, and quantity
of water authorized for extraction; and zit−1
is a vector of lagged dummy variables indicating if various crops were planted in the
previous season to account for crop rotation
patterns. Following Pfeiffer and Lin (2013),
dit are variables that would impact a farmer’s
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decision if he optimized dynamically, including recharge, saturated thickness, the amount
pumped in the previous period by neighbors,
and a 10-year forecast of future commodities
prices.
The system of equations corresponding to
(1) and (2) can be estimated using Lee’s
generalization of Amemiya’s two-step estimator to a simultaneous equation model (Lee
1990); Lee (1990) also shows that this procedure leads to estimates that are asymptotically
more efficient than the Heckman selection
model (Heckman 1978). In the first step, probit
regressions corresponding to the crop selection equations (1) are estimated to measure
the effect of the explanatory variables on the
decision to grow each crop c. Inverse-Mills
ratios (IMRc ) are calculated for each crop. In
the second step, the inverse-Mills ratios are
included as explanatory variables in the crop
acreage allocation equations corresponding to
equation (2). The ratios are estimated as a
simultaneous system of equations to exploit the
information contained in the cross-equation
correlations.1
The coefficients of interest are the coefficients on energy prices et in the selectivitycorrected cropland allocation models in
equation (2). We include energy prices both
by themselves and interacted with depth to
groundwater, since we expect that the energy
costs of pumping may increase with the distance the water needs to be pumped.
Parameters in selection models are estimated with more precision if some regressors
in the selection equation can be excluded from
the outcome equation (Wooldridge 2002). To
estimate the coefficients on energy price and on
energy price interacted with depth to groundwater in the crop acreage equations (2), we
exclude the lagged crop choice variables zit−1
from the crop acreage equations (2), but not
from the crop choice equations (1). Lagged
crop choices are likely to affect a farmer’s crop
choice decisions but arguably do not affect
the crop acreage decision. Whether or not a
farmer planted a particular crop during the previous year may affect which crops he plants this
year due to crop rotation patterns, but conditional on making a particular crop choice in the
1
Correlation across the errors in different equations can provide links that can be exploited in a system estimation to improve
estimator efficiency (Ruud 2000; Wooldridge 2002). Even if the
system estimators are asymptotically equivalent to the equationby-equation estimators, system estimation enables one to estimate
the covariances between the estimators from different equations
(Wooldridge 2002).
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Table 3. Probit Results for Crop Selection
Dependent variable is probability of planting:
Alfalfa
Energy price ($/million btu)

−0.023∗∗∗

(0.004)
−0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00003)
−0.0007∗∗
(0.0002)
Alfalfa price ($/ton yearly aver0.003∗∗
age)
(0.001)
Corn price ($/bu futures)
0.269∗
(0.119)
Sorghum price ($/bu spring aver- −0.062∗∗∗
age)
(0.016)
Soybeans price ($/bu futures)
−0.052∗
(0.023)
Kansas wheat price ($/bu futures)
0.329∗∗∗
(0.040)
Recharge (in)
0.046∗∗∗
(0.014)
Average yearly precipitation, −0.043∗∗∗
1971–2001 (in)
(0.005)
Average evapotranspiration (in)
0.044∗∗∗
(0.011)
Slope (% of distance)
0.082∗∗∗
(0.007)
Irrigated Capability Class = 1
−0.269∗∗∗
(0.016)
Saturated thickness of the aquifer −0.269∗∗∗
(ft)
(0.012)
Quantity authorized for extraction −0.00008
(af)
(0.00004)
Field size (ac)
−0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Center pivot irrigation system
0.079∗∗∗
(compared to flood)
(0.021)
Center pivot irrigation system
0.076∗∗∗
with dropped nozzles (compared (0.018)
to flood)
10-year forecast of the real −0.383∗∗∗
acreage-weighted
price
of (0.052)
commodities ($/bu)
Quantity of water used by neigh0.0001∗∗∗
bors in 1 mile radius in t-1 (af)
(0.0000)
Planted alfafa in t-1 (dummy)
2.521∗∗∗
(0.015)
Planted corn in t-1 (dummy)
−0.336∗∗∗
(0.014)
Planted sorghum in t-1 (dummy)
−0.170∗∗∗
(0.028)
Planted soybeans in t-1 (dummy) −0.251∗∗∗
(0.025)
Planted wheat in t-1 (dummy)
0.050∗∗
(0.018)
Left land fallow or planted with a −0.070∗∗
non-irrigated plot in t-1 (dummy)
(0.024)
Energy price ($/million btu)∗
Depth to groundwater (ft)
Depth to groundwater (ft)

Corn

Sorghum

0.001
(0.002)
0.0001∗∗
(0.00002)
0.0003∗∗
(0.0001)
−0.001∗
(0.0005)
0.160∗
(0.070)
−0.090∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.043∗∗
(0.013)
0.063∗∗
(0.023)
−0.109∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.042∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.059∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.004
(0.005)
0.023∗
(0.009)
0.023∗
(0.009)
0.00005∗
(0.00002)
−0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000)
0.166∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.201∗∗∗
(0.010)

0.023∗∗∗

−0.028∗∗∗

(0.004)
−0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00003)
0.0005∗
(0.0002)
0.002∗∗
(0.0008)
−0.807∗∗∗
(0.117)
0.190∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.016
(0.022)
−0.105∗∗
(0.038)
−0.009
(0.011)
0.009∗
(0.004)
−0.013
(0.011)
0.030∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.107∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.107∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.00005
(0.00003)
0.0007∗∗∗
(0.0001)
−0.258∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.324∗∗∗
(0.014)

(0.003)
0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00002)
−0.0017∗∗∗
(0.0002)
−0.001
(0.001)
0.515∗∗∗
(0.093)
−0.054∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.003
(0.018)
−0.173∗∗∗
(0.029)
0.012
(0.007)
0.134∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.182∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.058∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.026∗
(0.011)
0.026∗
(0.011)
−0.00004
(0.00003)
−0.0002∗
(0.0001)
−0.023
(0.016)
0.048∗∗∗
(0.013)

0.023∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00002)
0.0004∗
(0.0002)
−0.002∗
(0.0006)
−0.462∗∗∗
(0.086)
0.111∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.029
(0.016)
−0.071∗
(0.028)
−0.032∗∗
(0.010)
−0.054∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.058∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.006
(0.006)
0.056∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.056∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.00002
(0.00002)
0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0000)
0.030∗
(0.015)
0.008
(0.012)

−0.396∗∗∗
(0.040)

0.136∗∗∗
(0.037)

0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000)
−0.267∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.630∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.447∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.905∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.122∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.080∗∗∗
(0.024)

−0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000)
−0.153∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.114∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.301∗∗∗
(0.016)
0.291∗∗∗
(0.015)
1.636∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.039∗
(0.018)

0.401∗∗∗
(0.030)
0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000)
−0.494∗∗∗
(0.014)
1.400∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.022
(0.015)
0.787∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.089∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.261∗∗∗
(0.015)

0.091
(0.050)
−0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000)
−0.066∗∗
(0.022)
−0.091∗∗∗
(0.013)
1.552∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.280∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.414∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.057∗∗
(0.022)

Soybeans

Wheat

continued.
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Table 3. continued
Dependent variable is probability of planting:
Alfalfa
Constant

Corn

−3.279∗∗∗
(0.657)

−6.465∗∗∗
(0.365)

154,619

154,619

Observations

Sorghum
−0.804
(0.606)
154,619

Soybeans
−13.72∗∗∗
(0.465)
154,619

Wheat
2.827∗∗∗
(0.463)
154,619

Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors appear in parentheses. For the energy price, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers
in counties with natural gas production and the diesel price as the energy price for all other farmers. Significance is denoted as follows: ∗ = 5% level, ∗∗ = 1%
level, and ∗∗∗ = 0.1% level.

present year, the previous year’s crop choice is
unlikely to affect the acreage allocated to each
crop for the present year.2
The intensive margin of the groundwater
extraction decision is the water demand conditional on crop choice, which is estimated using
ordinary least squares:
(3)

wit = h(et , nict ∗ , x it , dit )

where wit is the amount of water extracted
by farmer i in year t. In the water demand
equation (3), we include both energy price and
energy price squared, as well as energy price
interacted with depth to groundwater. We also
include number of acres planted to each crop
and the number of acres planted to each crop
squared.
The total marginal effect of energy prices is
the sum of the effect along the intensive margin from the water demand equation (3) and
the effects along the extensive margin from
the selectivity-corrected cropland allocation
models (Moore, Gollehon, and Carey 1994) in
equation (2):3
(4)

dw ∂w  ∂w ∂nc ∗
=
+
.
de
∂e
∂nc ∗ ∂e
c

2
Even though excluding last year’s crop choice from the acreage
allocation regressions improves the efficiency of our estimators, this
exclusion restriction is not necessary for identification (Wooldridge
2002). Our results on the effects of energy price were robust regarding whether the lagged crop choice variables are excluded from
the crop acreage allocation regressions and also robust regarding
whether lagged crop acreage is added to both the crop choice and
the crop acreage allocation regressions.
3
Another possible decision is to not irrigate some acres. Unfortunately, the data does not permit us to analyze this decision. We
only observe if the entire field was not irrigated, but we do not
observe whether part of the field was not irrigated, nor do we
observe the number of acres that were not irrigated. In the regressions of water demand conditional on crop choice, we control for
whether the entire field was not irrigated. In the probit regressions of crop choice, we control for whether the entire field was not
irrigated in the previous year.

Results
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimation results
for equations (1) and (2), respectively, using
our base case specification for energy price.
When considering only the significant coefficients on energy price and on the interaction
between energy price and depth to groundwater in table 4, and when evaluated at the mean
depth to groundwater, our results show that
energy prices cause a significant decrease in
the acreage allocated to corn, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat, and a significant increase in
the acreage allocated to alfafa. An increase in
the energy price of $1 per million btu decreases
the number of acres allocated to corn,sorghum,
soybeans, and wheat by 1.30, 0.83, 2.21, and 0.80
acres per farmer, respectively. These acreage
values are between 0.43% and 1.20% of the
average field size. An increase in the energy
price of $1 per million btu increases the number of acres allocated to alfafa by 0.03 acres per
farmer, which is 0.02% of the average field size.
The results of estimating equation (3), water
use along the intensive margin, conditional
on crop choice, for the base case specification of energy price, are presented in table 5.
As expected, the coefficient on the interaction
between energy price and depth to groundwater is negative. As the distance the water needs
to be pumped increases, the energy costs of
pumping increases. Thus, increases in energy
prices cause a greater decrease in water use
conditional on crop choice as the depth to
groundwater increases.
Table 6 summarizes the calculations used to
derive the total intensive margin, which are
based on the coefficients on the energy price,
on energy price squared, and on the interaction
between energy price and depth to groundwater in the water use regression in table 5, all
of which are significant. Evaluated at mean
energy price and mean depth to groundwater, an increase in energy prices by $1 per
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Table 4. Selectivity-corrected Results for Crop Acreage Allocation (Extensive Margin)
Dependent variable is number of acres allocated to:

Energy price ($/million btu)
Energy price ($/million btu) * Depth
to groundwater (ft)
Depth to groundwater (ft)
Alfalfa price ($/ton yearly average)
Corn price ($/bu futures)
Sorghum price ($/bu spring average)
Soybeans price ($/bu futures)
Kansas wheat price ($/bu futures)
Recharge (in)
Average yearly precipitation, 1971–
2000 (in)
Average evapotranspiration (in)
Slope (% of distance)
Irrigated Capability Class = 1
Saturated thickness of the aquifer (ft)
Quantity authorized for extraction
(af)
Field size (ac)
Center pivot irrigation system (compared to flood)
Center pivot irrigation system with
dropped nozzles (compared to flood)
10 year forecast of the real acreageweighted price of commodities ($/bu)
Quantity of water used by neighbors
in 1 mile radius in t-1 (af)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant
Observations

Alfalfa

Corn

−0.969∗∗∗

−2.430∗∗∗

Sorghum
−0.831∗∗

(0.251)
(0.126)
(0.305)
0.008∗∗∗
0.009∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
−0.069∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.014)
(0.007)
(0.016)
0.109∗
0.015
−0.016
(0.051)
(0.027)
(0.068)
−4.808
8.840∗∗ −17.96
(6.681)
(3.338)
(9.286)
1.527
−3.845∗∗∗
3.627∗∗
(0.864)
(0.473)
(1.163)
−1.719
0.370
−0.723
(1.269)
(0.653)
(1.727)
−0.860
3.290∗∗
5.072
(2.193)
(1.134)
(3.036)
−1.662
−4.023∗∗∗ −4.197∗∗∗
(1.003)
(0.367)
(0.823)
−0.537
3.207∗∗∗
2.051∗∗∗
(0.344)
(0.141)
(0.343)
−6.177∗∗∗
2.577∗∗∗
3.337∗∗∗
(0.704)
(0.323)
(0.902)
0.679
0.477
−0.829
(0.388)
(0.247)
(0.583)
−11.51∗∗∗
−6.963∗∗∗ −5.352∗∗∗
(0.989)
(0.434)
(1.127)
0.061∗∗∗
0.094∗∗∗
0.033∗∗∗
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.006)
0.013∗∗∗
0.022∗∗∗
0.0130∗∗∗
(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.002)
0.266∗∗∗
0.272∗∗∗
0.195∗∗∗
(0.005)
(0.002)
(0.005)
48.08∗∗∗
33.17∗∗∗
23.54∗∗∗
(1.262)
(0.603)
(1.490)
45.55∗∗∗
34.47∗∗∗
21.91∗∗∗
(1.114)
(0.505)
(1.191)
0.781
−8.826∗∗∗ −1.948
(2.952)
(1.508)
(4.016)
0.006∗∗∗
0.011∗∗∗
0.003∗
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
−8.028∗∗∗ −1.374∗∗
3.787∗∗∗
(0.466)
(0.513)
(0.769)
391.3∗∗∗ −159.5∗∗∗ −180.5∗∗∗
(41.92)
(18.55)
(51.90)
154,619

154,619

154,619

Soybeans
−2.213∗∗∗
(0.174)
0.002
(0.001)
−0.019
(0.012)
−0.043
(0.043)
18.82∗∗∗
(5.702)
−4.949∗∗∗
(0.727)
0.631
(1.096)
−2.189
(1.777)
−0.660
(0.389)
3.245∗∗∗
(0.225)
0.127
(0.517)
−1.939∗∗∗
(0.412)
−4.800∗∗∗
(0.678)
0.018∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.013∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.195∗∗∗
(0.005)
28.60∗∗∗
(0.962)
29.96∗∗∗
(0.787)
−23.23∗∗∗
(2.485)
0.009∗∗∗
(0.001)
22.91∗∗∗
(0.814)
−9.437
(31.01)
154,619

Wheat
−0.797∗∗∗
(0.216)
0.002
(0.001)
0.024∗
(0.009)
0.063
(0.041)
−2.484
(5.287)
−0.347
(0.704)
0.693
(1.004)
0.105
(1.745)
−1.955∗∗
(0.749)
0.923∗∗∗
(0.226)
2.838∗∗∗
(0.561)
1.215∗∗
(0.374)
−5.511∗∗∗
(0.662)
0.058∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.013∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.229∗∗∗
(0.003)
19.16∗∗∗
(0.886)
19.18∗∗∗
(0.703)
1.797
(2.342)
0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
1.897∗∗∗
(0.501)
−163.9∗∗∗
(31.69)
154,619

Notes: Standard errors appeaer in parentheses. For the energy price, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas
production and the diesel price as the energy price for all other farmers. Significance is denoted as follows: ∗ = 5% level, ∗∗ = 1% level, and ∗∗∗ = 0.1% level.

million btu decreases water demand conditional on crop choice by 5.145 acre-feet along
the intensive margin.
Table 7 summarizes the calculations used to
derive the total extensive margin. We consider
only the significant coefficients on the energy

price and on the interaction between energy
price and depth to groundwater in table 4, and
only the significant coefficients on acres allocated to each crop and acres allocated to each
crop squared in table 5. We evaluate the effects
of crop acreage on water use at the mean acres
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Table 5. Results for Water Demand Conditional on Crop Choice (Intensive Margin)
Dependent variable is quantity of irrigation water pumped (acre-feet)
Energy price ($/million btu)
Energy price ($/million btu) squared
Energy price ($/million btu) ∗ Depth to groundwater (ft)
Depth to groundwater (ft)
Acres planted to alfalfa
Acres planted to alfalfa squared
Acres planted to corn
Acres planted to corn squared
Acres planted to sorghum
Acres planted to sorghum squared
Acres planted to soybeans
Acres planted to soybeans squared
Acres planted to wheat
Acres planted to wheat squared
Recharge (in)
Average yearly precipitation, 1971–2000 (in)
Average evapotranspiration (in)
Slope (% of distance)
Irrigated Capability Class = 1 (Dummy)
Saturated thickness of the aquifer (ft)
Quantity authorized for extraction (af)
Field size (ac)
Center pivot irrigation system (compared to flood)
Center pivot irrigation system with dropped nozzles (compared to flood)
10 year forecast of the real acreage-weighted price of commodities ($/bu)
Left land fallow or planted with a non-irrigated plot (dummy)
Quantity of water used by neighbors in 1 mile radius in t-1 (af)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

−5.029∗∗∗
(0.292)
0.163∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.020∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.290∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.483∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.00026∗∗∗
(0.00006)
0.307∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.00038∗∗∗
(0.00002)
−0.168∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.00069∗∗∗
(0.00009)
0.226∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.00026∗∗
(0.00010)
−0.104∗∗∗
(0.0114)
0.00035∗∗∗
(0.00006)
−3.914∗∗∗
(0.425)
1.271∗∗∗
(0.167)
0.990∗∗
(0.373)
2.423∗∗∗
(0.282)
−12.04∗∗∗
(0.525)
0.159∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.062∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.336∗∗∗
(0.003)
−6.251∗∗∗
(0.713)
−4.298∗∗∗
(0.584)
−40.69∗∗∗
(1.038)
−134.8∗∗∗
(0.865)
0.0194∗∗∗
(0.001)
85.01∗∗∗
(21.35)
154,619
0.53

Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses. For the energy price, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas
production and the diesel price as the energy price for all other farmers. Significance is denotes as follows: ∗ = 5% level, ∗∗ = 1% level, and ∗∗∗ = 0.1% level.
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Table 6. Total Intensive Margin
Coefficient on energy price
5.029
Coeffficient on energy price squared
0.163
Coefficient on energy price ∗ depth to −0.020
groundwater
Mean energy price ($/million btu)
7.33
Mean depth to groundwater (ft)
125.27


∂w
TOTAL INTENSIVE MARGIN
−5.145
∂e
Notes: Only significant coefficients are used in the calculation. The effect of
energy price on water use is evaluated at the mean energy price and the mean
depth to groundwater. Energy prices e are in $/million btu. Water use w is in
acre-feet. For the energy price, we use the natural gas price as the energy price
for farmers in counties with natural gas production, and the diesel price as the
energy price for all other farmers.

Table 7. Total Extensive Margin

Alfafa
Corn
Sorghum
Soybeans
Wheat

∂w
∂nc ∗

∂nc ∗
∂e

∂w ∂nc ∗
∂nc ∗ ∂e

0.477
0.352
−0.161
0.232
−0.092

0.033
−1.303
−0.831
−2.213
−0.797

0.016
−0.459
0.134
−0.513
0.074

TOTAL
EXTENSIVE
MARGIN


 ∂w ∂nc ∗
c
∂nc ∗ ∂e

−0.749

Notes: Only significant coefficients are used in the calculation. The effects of
crop acreage on water use are evaluated at mean crop acreage. The effects of
energy price on crop acreage are evaluated at the mean depth to groundwater.
Energy prices e are in $/million btu. Water use w is in acre-feet. The number
of acres nc ∗ planted to each crop c is in acres. For the energy price, we use the
natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas
production and the diesel price as the energy price for all other farmers.

allocated to each crop, and evaluate the effects
of energy price on crop acreage at the mean
depth to groundwater. An increase in energy
prices by $1 per million btu decreases water use
by 0.749 acre-feet along the extensive margin.

We are mainly interested in the total
marginal effects of an increase in the energy
price, calculated using equation (4) and reported in table 8. An increase in energy prices
would decrease water use along both the intensive and extensive margins. Our estimated total
marginal effect of energy prices,which sums the
effects on the intensive and extensive margins,
is that an increase in the energy price of $1 per
million btu, which is approximately 13.6% of
its mean value over the time period of our data
set, would decrease water extraction by an individual farmer by 5.89 acre-feet per year, which
is approximately 3.6% of the average amount
pumped in a year by a farmer. Our estimated
elasticity of water extraction with respect to
energy price is −0.26.
In table 8, we also report the total marginal
effects resulting from two alternative specifications for the energy price. In specification A, we
use the natural gas price as the energy price for
farmers in counties with natural gas production
and the electricity price (instead of the diesel
price) as the energy price for all other farmers,
and find that an increase in the energy price
of $1 per million btu, which is approximately
8.9% of its mean value over the time period of
our data set, would decrease water extraction
by an individual farmer by 2.17 acre-feet per
year, which is approximately 1.3% of the average amount pumped in a year by a farmer. Our
estimated elasticity of water extraction with
respect to energy price under specification A
is −0.15.
In specification B, we use the natural gas
price as the energy price for all farmers,and find
that an increase in the energy price of $1 per
million btu, which is approximately 20.0% of
its mean value over the time period of our data
set, would decrease water extraction by an individual farmer by 8.57 acre-feet per year, which

Table 8. Total Marginal Effects
Base case Alternative A Alternative B




∂w

 ∂e
 ∂w ∂nc ∗
Total extensive margin
∗ ∂e
c ∂nc 

dw ∂w  ∂w ∂nc ∗
TOTAL MARGINAL EFFECT
=
+
∗ ∂e
de
∂e
c ∂nc
Total intensive margin

−5.145

−2.002

−8.126

−0.749

−0.170

−0.439

−5.89

−2.17

−8.57

Notes: Only significant coefficients are used in the calculation. The effects of energy price on crop acreage and on water use are evaluated at the mean energy
price and the mean depth to groundwater. The effects of crop acreage on water use are evaluated at mean crop acreage. Energy prices e are in $/million btu.
Water use w is in acre-feet. The number of acres nc ∗ planted to each crop c is in acres. Results are presented for three specifications of the energy price. In the
base case specification, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas production and the diesel price as the energy price
for all other farmers. In specification A, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for farmers in counties with natural gas production and the electricity
price as the energy price for all other farmers. In specification B, we use the natural gas price as the energy price for all farmers.

Pfeiffer and Lin

The Effects of Energy Prices on Agricultural Groundwater Extraction

is approximately 5.2% of the average amount
pumped in a year by a farmer. Our estimated
elasticity of water extraction with respect to
energy price under specification B is −0.26.
The total marginal effect for the base case
specification of energy price is in between the
total marginal effect for specification A and the
total marginal effect for specification B. The
estimated elasticities for all three specifications
are similar, and are equal to −0.26 for both the
base case and for specification B. Our results
on the effects of energy price therefore appear
robust to the energy price specification used.
Conclusion
In this article we examine the effects of
energy prices on groundwater extraction using
an econometric model of a farmer’s irrigation water pumping decision that accounts for
both the intensive and extensive margins. Our
results show that energy prices have an effect
on both margins. Higher energy prices affect
crop selection decisions, crop acreage allocation decision, and farmers’ demand for water.
Higher energy prices decrease water use along
both the intensive and extensive margins.
Our estimated total marginal effect, which
sums the effects at the intensive and extensive margins, shows that a $1 increase in the
energy price, which is approximately 13.6% of
its mean value over the time period of our data
set, would decrease water extraction by an individual farmer by 5.89 acre-feet per year, which
is approximately 3.6% of the average amount
pumped in a year by a farmer. The estimated
elasticity of water extraction with respect to
energy price is −0.26.
Our results suggest that energy prices do
have an effect on groundwater extraction,
causing water use to decrease along both
the intensive and extensive margins. This
finding is particularly important in the face
of possible increases in energy prices in the
future, which may cause farmers to respond
by decreasing their water use. Our results
also suggest that policies that reduce energy
prices would cause groundwater extraction to
increase, therefore posing a potential concern
to conservationists who are worried about
declining water table levels in many of the
world’s most productive agricultural basins
that depend on groundwater.
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